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Habermas, Rawls, and the Paradox of Impartiality'
"Sollen und Sein klaffen bei uns weiter 
auseinander als bei anderen, weil eben 
das Sollen sehr hoch gesetzt ist."
-  Thomas Mann, Doktor Faustus
The social and political life of contemporary western societies 
has been increasingly characterised by conflicts over values. 
Instances of this tendency are conflicts involving religious 
sects, homosexuality, feminism, youth subcultures, abortion, 
AIDS, ecological protection, urban development, and school 
protests by parent associations. Political sociology has 
addressed this question with conceptual tools such as 
postmaterialism (Inglehart), new social movements (Raschke, 
Offe), civic culture (Alman and Verba) or postmodernism 
(Baudrillard). Rather than contributing to this debate, our aim 
is to look at these value conflicts from the viewpoint of moral 
and political philosophy and its project of a theory of justice 
adequate to the task of the regulation of interpersonal conflict 
in these societies. This orients our path of investigation 
towards how such theories address questions of right and 
wrong arising from these conflicts. We compare, for example, 
whether the demands put forward by members of a 
fundamentalist religious sect or of an ecological group will be 
judged to be right or wrong; "right”, in the sense that they are
Paper presented for discussion in the "Rechtstheoretische Arbeitsgruppe - 
Leibniz Projekt”, J.W. Goethe Universitât Frankfurt 15.02.1990 and at the 





























































































allowed fulfilment within the democratic constitutional state, 
and "wrong", in the sense that they are disallowed.
This form of comparison is motivated by the perception of the 
many similarities between such movements. Claus Offe1 * has 
characterised "new social movements" as enforcing no division 
between the public and private roles of their members, as 
advancing demands on the basis of principled value-systems 
defining relations to other political actors in terms of sharp 
oppositions such as "us and them", "victory or defeat", "now or 
never" — oppositions which place them in positions not open to 
negotiation. But this also seems to be the case for religious 
movements. Offe distinguishes "new social movements” from 
"socio-cultural movements" such as religious fundamentalism, 
on the basis that the latter do not seek to bind the social
i
whole to their demands should they be successful, and the fact 
that they are prepared to retreat to the domain of the private 
if they be unsuccessful. But the experiences of evangelical T.V. 
preaching, battles over arts and literature censorship, abortion 
or sexual practices motivated by religious sects at the level of 
challenges to legislation binding the whole citizenry, point 
against the empirical finding of "withdrawal”. The issue of how 
justice is to differentiate between these types of movements 
remains. And it becomes all the more pressing once we 
consider that the increasing mobility within the world-society 
promises not only a greater degree of multi-culturalism, but
1 "Challenging the boundaries of institutional politics: social movements
since the 1960s" in Charles S. Maier, ed., Changing Boundaries of the




























































































also a greater degree of value conflict between the multiplicity 
of cultural groupings.
In addressing this question we invoke the important role of 
intuition in moral and political philosophy. It is our intuition 
that moral and political philosophy — like many other 
disciplines — have to cope with paradoxes which arise from the 
processes of its conceptual development. According to Quine, a 
paradox is a conclusion that at first sight appears absurd, but 
which has an argument to sustain it. The apparently absurd 
conclusion "packs a surprise, but it is seen as a false alarm 
when we solve the underlying fallacy"2. Since a fallacy is 
simply an invalid form of argument3, such paradoxes may be 
resolved by tracking down the fallacy in the argument. 
However, when confronted with the special form of paradox 
called "antinomy", we have no such easy way out. Here the 
resolution must come through conceptual innovation, a new 
way of looking at the matter that generates the paradox4.
Standing in the Kantian tradition, John Rawls and Jurgen 
Habermas have both sought to construct a theory of justice
2 W.V.O. Quine, The Ways of Paradox and other Essays (Cambridge MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 9.
3 Cf. J.L. Mackie, "Fallacies" in Encyclopedia of Philosophy, voi. 3, ed. P. 
Edwards (London: Macmillan, 1967), p.169.
4 Cf. Fletcher, "Paradoxes in Legal Thought”, 85 Columbia Law Review, 
1985, p. 1263. There is a considerable body of literature on this topic. See 
also Niklas Luhmann, "The Third Question: The Creative Use of 
Paradoxes in Law and Legal History" in Journal o f Law and Society 15 
(1988), pp.153-165; Gunther Teubner, Recht als autopoietisches System, 
(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1989), Ch. 1; Michael Walzer, Interpretation and 




























































































capable of effecting impartial judgments between citizens of 
the democratic constitutional state. According to both theorists, 
impartial judgment - the sustained commitment to the idea of 
the "rule of law" - provides the basis of legitimate political and 
judicial authority. It does so on the basis that the right does 
not commit itself to a particular conception of the good, and, in 
so far, is acceptable to all citizens as impartial to their 
individual value-systems. A paradox emerges when the 
impartial regulation of a conflict stemming from the radically 
diverse value systems of the conflicting parties requires the 
rejection of one of these value systems from the democratic 
state. From the standpoint of the theory of justice, the paradox 
is resolved through the claim that the theory of justice is in 
fact impartial. But if the theorist is to avoid a self-referential 
claim to legitimacy, he must remove the paradox to the level 
of addressing the question of why impartiality is impartial. 
Here, the legitimacy of restricting a value system’s existence 
relies on how successfully theorists such as Rawls and 
Habermas can prove the impartiality of impartiality without 
reference to the standpoint of ... impartiality.
In this paper we enter the structural paradoxes of both 
theories by comparing the principles of justice used by Rawls 
and Habermas to make an impartial (and hence legitimate) 
distinction between a case of "civil disobedience" and a case of 
"intolerance" (Rawls) or "pathology" (Habermas). For Rawls, 
the category of civil disobedience marks the point where a 
theory of justice moves from the norms of justice 




























































































norms of justice characterizing the "just society"5. Habermas in 
turn, takes civil disobedience as an important "limiting case" 
indicating how argumentations for the validity of proposed 
norms can sometimes "burst open the very legal form in which 
[such argumentation procedures] are institutionalized" in the 
democratic constitutional state6. The category of civil 
disobedience therefore functions as a type of filter mechanism 
through which the acceptance or rejection of new norms fulfils 
the promise of an impartial protection of pluralism. It thus 
provides the cutting edge of the distinction drawn from the 
standpoint of the right over various concepts of the good.
1 Distinguishing protest actions: Attributing difference to 
identity?
Let us assume two cases of protest action which produce acts 
relevant for the consideration of a legal system in a Western 
constitutional democracy. In both cases the acts bear the 
narrow, prima facie legal description of the "partial occupation 
o f, and the "obstruction of passage upon" public property (the 
site may be an administration office, a school, a public gallery, 
a hospital). The tribunal characterizes the acts as identical and 
illegal.
5 A Theory o f Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), hereinafter 
cited as TJ, pp.391, 351, 363.
6 "Law and Morality”, The Tanner Lectures on Human Values vol. VIII, 
ed. M. McMurrin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p.278 




























































































The identity of the two cases may be broken should the 
protesters in one case convince the tribunal to so contextualize 
their illegal acts, as to distinguish their case as a case of "civil 
disobedience". In most liberal democratic theories of justice, the 
category of civil disobedience has normative force in so far as 
it trumps the initial distinction of "legal" versus "illegal" 
through the introduction of a further distinction of "legitimate" 
versus "illegitimate". By virtue of this distinction, acts 
considered under the category of civil disobedience may be 
characterized as illegal but nevertheless legitimate due to their 
appeal to a principle of justice not reducible to the self- 
referential legality of positive law. We have referred to the 
general, normative "filter mechanism" function of this category 
above. The filtering begins by offering agents of acts of civil 
disobedience more favourable treatment with respect to the 
prosecution of their acts, and the probability and degree of 
their sentencing7.
Should we attempt a "thicker" description of the acts of 
occupation and obstruction so as to examine whether one of 
these cases might be distinguished as a case of civil 
disobedience, we might imagine the possibility of a continuing 
identity: In both cases, the acts have been planned by 
community groups to protest government legislation. They are 
"symbolic" in so far as permanent occupation and obstruction 
are not defined as political ends. No ownership claim is being
7 It goes without saying that public recognition of the category of "civil 
disobedience" would also gradually affect the initial probability of arrest. 
An extensive review of the literature on "civil disobedience" is offered by 
Gunther Frankenberg, "Ziviler Ungehorsam und Rechtsstaatliche 




























































































made to the public property. Furthermore, the protesters have 
stated their arguments in media interviews aimed at 
persuading the public of their viewpoint, and have claimed 
that they shall desist from their strategy of occupation and 
obstruction only upon the repeal of the legislation. They 
submit to police arrest peacefully. On trial, both groups 
establish that they are not protesting the legislation on the 
level of its "wisdom", or its appropriateness for the 
achievement of otherwise uncontroversial public goal or value. 
On the contrary, they argue that the legislation is "immoral" 
because it misconstrues an existing public value in a way that 
threatens the existence of another value to which they 
attribute the same public character8 *.
Now, if we are to imagine that the roles of these two parties 
are to be filled by a religious fundamentalist group, and by a 
so-termed "new social movement" such as an ecological 
movement, we would probably find that in both theories of 
justice proposed by Rawls and Habermas, the former would be 
placed in the category of intolerance/social pathology, while the 
latter would be treated as a case of civil disobedience. This 
would have the effect of giving the ecological protestors the 
leniency of treatment requisite to an inclusion of their
8 The distinction drawn between the two levels of claim below, is broadly
based on Dworkin’s distinction between "justice-based” and "policy-based" 
civil disobedience in Ronald Dworkin, "Civil Disobedience and Nuclear 
Protest” in A Matter o f Principle (Cambridge MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1985), pp.104-116. As Dworkin indicates many cases of policy-based 
disobedience are potentially reducible to the non-existence or division of 
expert opinion regarding the effects of alternative policy options. Although 
these cases involve interesting questions as to the adjudication of 
mutually exclusive, or rival but inadequate epistemological claims, they 




























































































proposed norm of justice in the principles of justice regulating 
the democratic constitutional state.
To uphold a distinction between what hitherto appear to have 
been identical cases on the basis that one group of protesters 
makes a claim to a "legitimate" principle of law while the 
other does not, would be prima facie against the commitment 
to the "rule of law” which commands that like appeals to the 
same legal principle be treated impartially9. Those who would 
wish to simultaneously defend impartiality and employ the 
category of civil disobedience to distinguish between these two 
cases, must accept the onus of proving where the difference 
lies. And to satisfy the self-imposed requirement of 
impartiality, the philosopher’s distinction between an "illegal 
but legitimate" act and an "illegal and illegitimate" act must 
itself be shown to be ... legitimate10 *. The onus of proof has 
been accepted. Habermas has claimed that:
Those who, for normative reasons, wish to delineate legality
from legitimacy must of course be in a position to
9 For the commitment to the "rule of law", see TJ, s.38; Habermas, "Law 
and Morality", and "Towards a Communication-Concept of Rational 
Collective Will-Formation. A Thought Experiment" in Ratio Juris 2 (1989), 
pp.144-154 (cited as "Towards a Communication-Concept...").
10 Niklas Luhmann describes this argumentational move as the application 
of a binary code to itself. In this case, the legal system’s binary code of 
"right" versus "wrong" which underlies the basis of the first distinction
"legal" vs. "illegal", is applied yet again to itself in the form of the
"legitimate" vs. "illegitimate" distinction. The question now posed by 
Luhmann is the "third question" which arises upon repeating this 
manouevre at the level of the "legitimate" vs. "illegitimate" distinction:
"How can we rightly or wrongly differentiate the right and the wrong?" 




























































































distinguish those legitimating constitutional principles which 
are based in sound reasoning and deserve recognition11.
And although Rawls does not use the words "legitimate" or
"legitimacy”, he too argues for the ability to recognize and
distinguish a category of legally relevant acts which "expresses
disobedience to the law within the limits of fidelity to the law,
although it is at the outer edge thereof'12. For Rawls, it is
no doubt ... possible to imagine a legal system in which 
conscientious belief that the law is unjust is accepted as a 
defence for non-compliance. Men of great honesty with full 
confidence in one another might make such a system work13.
2.1 Rawls: "Primary goods" and "appropriate" claims to
justice"
Under Rawls’ formula for civil disobedience, illegal acts fall 
under the category of civil disobedience when they express 
underlying fidelity to law, a non-violent character and when 
their agents are willing to accept the consequences of their 
conduct (eg. by submitting to arrest)14 *. Further, the acts must 
have a "symbolic" and "public” character in that they "are not 
grounded solely on group or self-interest", but rather "address
11 Jurgen Habermas, "Civil Disobedience: Litmus Test for the Democratic 
Constitutional State" in Berkeley Journal o f Sociology 30 (1985), 
pp.95-116, p.102, hereinafter cited as "Litmus Test".
12 John Rawls, TJ, p.367.
13 Rawls, TJ, p.367. It is significant that Rawls qualifies his faith in the 
capacity to raise this plea by immediately adding: "But as things are, such 
a scheme would presumably be unstable even in a state of near justice. 
We must pay a certain price to convince others that our actions have, in 
our carefully considered view, a sufficient moral basis in the political 
convictions of the community" (Ibid).
14 The following account is a reconstruction of the category of "civil
disobedience" based on TJ, pp. 55-59. Since his magnus opus, Rawls has 




























































































the public’s sense of justice". All these conditions are met by 
the examples we have suggested above15. Where a difference in 
the two cases might emerge upon a Rawlsian interpretation, is 
in the appeal both parties would make to the principles of 
political justice16.
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls states that an agent may 
successfully claim to be acting within the framework of civil 
disobedience if he or she supports the claim by appeal to the 
"principles of justice which regulate the constitution and social 
institutions generally", and not to "principles of personal 
morality or to religious doctrines", though, as Rawls concedes, 
"these may coincide with and support one’s claims"17. In the 
later articles, Rawls specifies the way in which claims may be 
supported so that a distinction may be enforced between 
"appropriate" (i.e. legitimate) claims and "inappropriate" (i.e. 
illegitimate) claims18 *.
15 Rawls’ further condition that "civil disobedience” be an avenue of "last 
resort" after "normal appeals to the political majority have already been 
made in good faith and that they have failed" (TJ, p.373) could easily be 
implied for both our examples.
16 To recall the two principles of justice: (1) Each person has an equal 
right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with 
a similar scheme of liberties for all. (2) Social and economic inequalities 
are to satisfy two conditions: they must be (a) to the greatest benefit of 
the least advantaged members of society, and (b) attached to offices and 
positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.
17 TJ, p.365.
18 John Rawls, "Social Utility and Primary Goods" in Amartya Sen & 
Bernard Williams, ed., Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982), pp.159-185., pp.l61ff, pp.172-3 (hereinafter 
"SUPG”); and John John Rawls, "The Priority of Right and the Ideas of
the Good" in Philosophy and Public Affairs 17 (1988), pp.251-276., 




























































































"Appropriate" claims are supported by the fact of their 
reference to a list of "primary goods". In the "well-ordered 
society", all citizens affirm the same political conception of 
themselves as free and equal persons. In so doing, they 
recognize that their respective conceptions of the good - 
however distinct - require for their advancement roughly the 
same primary goods. The index of primary goods springs forth 
from the intuitive idea of society as a "fair system of 
cooperation" and aspires to achieving an "overlapping 
consensus" on a political conception of justice in a Western 
constitutional democracy19. It is important to note that the list 
is composed of those goods which would allow the realization 
of the "two powers of moral personality", namely "the capacity 
for a sense of right and justice, ... and the capacity to decide 
upon, to revise and rationally pursue a conception of the good” 
in a "life-plan”20. The primary goods are therefore as follows:
(a) Basic rights and liberties; eg. freedom of thought and 
liberty of conscience, freedom of association, the freedom 
defined by the liberty and the integrity of the person, as well 
as by the rule of law; and finally political liberties.
(b) Freedom of movement and choice of occupation against a 
background of diverse opportunities.
(c) Powers and prerogatives of offices and positions of 
responsibility, particularly those in the main political and 
economic institutions.
19 "SUPG", p.164; "PRIG", pp.275-276. In all writings since "Justice as 
Fairness, Political not Metaphysical", Philosophy and Public Affairs 14 
(1985), pp.223-251, and "The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus", Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 7 (1987), pp.1-25, (hereinafter cited as "OC"), 
Rawls has explicitly defended himself against charges of a metaphysical 
concept of justice by holding his concept of justice to be "political", and 
founded in the "practical political possibilities" of Western constitutional 
democracies. (Particularly in "OC" pp.24 & 3, and "JFPM", p.223).




























































































(d) Income and wealth.
(e) The social basis of self-respect21.
Cases of civil disobedience raise claims to justice that are 
prima facie "inappropriate" due to their failure to make 
reference to a good which is already part of the list of primary 
goods. A successful claim to civil disobedience would attempt to 
extend the list either by adding a newly-proposed good to it, or 
by reinterpreting one of the existing items so as to cover the 
claim to the new good. Rawls recognizes that "if necessary the 
list of primary goods can in principle be extended", subject to 
the condition that the proposed primary goods accord with the 
considerations which have characterized the selection of the 
existing goods22.
Conflicts of value - and not of interest - usually involve 
reference to either items (a) or (e) of the primary goods list. 
Liberalism’s traditional emphasis on item (a) - the basic rights 
and liberties - enables groups capable of phrasing their claims 
for justice within the form of "basic rights for individual 
citizens" a relatively easy path to an "appropriate” claim to 
justice. An ecological protest group might well argue the basic 
right to a "sound environment" on the basis that every citizen 
requires clean air and water to live life according to his or her 
own conception of the good. This would grant it an 
"appropriate" claim to justice, and a passage to the category of 
"civil disobedience".
21 "SUPG", p.162 and "PRIG”, p.257.




























































































Religious fundamentalists, are more likely than not to raise 
claims for basic rights which stem from, or are required by, 
their religious doctrines. Rawls regards such appeals as 
"inappropriate" due to their reference to "general and 
comprehensive moral doctrines", which he defines as follows:
A conception is said to be general when it applies to a wide 
range of subjects (in the limit of all subjects); it is 
comprehensive when it includes conceptions of what is of 
value in human life, ideals of personal virtue and character, 
and the like, that are to inform much of our non-political 
conduct. There is a tendency for religious and philosophical 
conceptions to be general and fully comprehensive; indeed 
their being so is sometimes regarded as an ideal to be 
realized.23
To incorporate value concepts derived from general and 
comprehensive moral doctrines into the principles of justice 
(and hence the list of primary goods) is to render the 
institutions of justice "sectarian", thereby cancelling the 
citizenry’s equal access to liberty24. A commonly raised 
fundamentalist argument for the protection of the value of 
family would be "inappropriate" - despite considerable support 
for the importance of the family in Rawls’ conception of 
psychological development25 - if it is argued on the basis of 
religiously sanctioned family role-models. If the "family" were 
to be included in a revised list of primary goods, the liberal 
approach would be to define it through its protective and
23 "PRIG", pp.252-253. See also "OC", p.3. fn.4. In fact, Rawls always 
illustrates "general and comprehensive doctrines" by reference to religious 
doctrines.
24 See eg. "OC", pp.2-5, 16-17.
26 Rawls’ idiosyncratic view of family role models is unexpectedly 
conservative, eg. the role models of "good wife and husband", "good son" 




























































































moral associative functions, rather than by its specific 
constitution (as some religious fundamentalists would have it, 
eg. pater familias as bread-winner and protector, wife and 
mother remaining by the hearth). This would be in accordance 
with the liberal commitment to providing a structural equality 
of opportunity between individual members of the "just 
society”.
Should protesters raising "inappropriate" claims to justice 
persist in their claim in ways that would cancel other citizens’ 
rights, eg. by cancelling their right to freedom of movement, 
or conscience, by blocking their entrance to schools or art 
galleries (rights which in the last analysis go to the stability of 
a liberal society’s basic institutions), their activities may be 
legitimately supressed as the actions of an "intolerant sect"26 *. 
On this basis they are distinguished from the agents of acts of 
civil disobedience. It is significant to note that the use of the 
category of intolerance to restrict the protest group’s pursuit of 
its conception of the good is said to be legitimate on the 
ground of the priority of the principles of justice (the right) to 
the sectarian conception of the good. It is assumed that the 
group’s members would - either in the "original position", or, 
as the later Rawls prefers, through "a public undertanding 
about the claims it is appropriate for citizens to make when
26 Rawls notes that "while an intolerant sect does not itself have the title
to claim of intolerance, its freedom should be restricted only when the 
tolerant sincerely and with reason believe their own security and that of
institutions of liberty are in danger...It is only the liberty of the intolerant 
which is to be limited, and this is done for the sake of equal liberty under 
a just constitution the principles of which the intolerant themselves would 
acknowledge in the original position" (TJ, p.220). On the requirement of 
stability for the system of justice, and stability as a political end, see TJ, 




























































































questions of political justice arise ... [and] how such claims are 
to be supported"27 (i.e. the primary goods thesis) - themselves 
accept the legitimacy of the principles under which their 
liberty is to be limited. But it is precisely this assumption, the 
assumption that religious fundamentalist communities would 
sacrifice the core commitments that go towards their self­
definition and integrity (that which Rawls assigns to the 
sphere of the private) to give priority to the right (the public) 
which seems questionable. The public-private distinction cannot 
be assumed of religious communities, nor can their 
commitment to a system of justice - based on the relatively 
impersonal structure of the nation-state - which would 
regularly classify value claims stemming from their religion as 
"inappropriate". To this extent, critics such as Bernard 
Williams have pointed out that the public understanding of 
moral personality in Rawls’ theory comports poorly with the 
nature of non-public aims and attachments28, while William 
Galston has indicated that for those excluded from the liberal 
society, "it is hard to see how liberalism can be experienced as 
anything other than an assault. Resistance is therefore to be 
expected, and it is far from clear on what basis it is to be 
condemned"29.
27 "PRIG", p.255.
28 See Bernard Williams, "Person, Character and Morality" in The Identity 
o f Persons, ed. Amelie O. Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1976), pp.210 & 215.
29 William Galston, "Pluralism and Social Unity" in Ethics 99 (1989), 
pp.711-726, p.718. The problem of strong religious views for the Rawlsian 
theory of impartiality, is dealt with by Thomas Nagel in "Moral Conflict 





























































































Attempting to accomodate this type of criticism, Will 
Kymlicka has recently defended liberalism on the basis of an 
expansion of the basic liberal rights and liberties to include 
the right to cultural membership. According to Kymlicka, the 
fact that cultural membership has not been recognized by 
liberal theorists as a primary good is simply because "Rawls 
and Dworkin, like most post-war political theorists, work with 
a very simplified model of the nation-state, where the political 
community is co-terminous with one and only one cultural 
community"30. Once this conflation is corrected, cultural 
membership may be placed within a liberal index of primary 
goods through an argument based on item (e) of Rawls’ list of 
primary goods, i.e. the social basis of self-respect, and the 
capacity to form a rational life-plan.
For Rawls, self-respect is equated with "the sense that one’s 
plan of life is worth carrying out". It follows that the 
individual’s capacity to decide upon, to revise and rationally 
pursue a conception of the good in a life-plan is only 
achievable through structural processes that encourage these 
possibilities. Kymlicka grants this argument a cultural 
background:
The processes by which options and choices become
significant for us are linguistic and historical processes.
Whether or not a course of action has any significance for
30 Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1989), p.177. According to Kymlicka, "a political community may be co­
extensive with one cultural community, as is envisaged in the ‘nation- 
state’...but the two forms of community may not coincide: the political 
community may contain two or more groups of people who have different 
cultures, speaking different languages, developing different cultural 
traditions. This is the situation in multinational, or culturally plural, 




























































































us depends on whether, or how our language renders vivid 
to us the point of that activity. And the way in which 
language renders vivid these activities is a matter of 
cultural heritage ... In order to make ... judgements [about 
how to lead our lives], we do not explore a number of 
different patterns of [activity], which might in principle be 
judged from any cultural structure. Rather we make these 
judgments precisely by examining the cultural structure, by 
coming to an awareness of the possibilities it has, the 
different activities it identifies as significant.31
Patterns of activity are only said to become significant through 
"a rich and secure cultural structure" whose narratives "offer 
alternative models and roles" some of which - those that strike 
us as "worth living (which may, of course, include the roles we 
were brought up to occupy)" - we come to adopt32. The 
absence of these structures debilitates persons from such life- 
plans. Arguing the case of the Inuit Indians of Canada, 
Kymlicka points out that the undermining of their culture by 
"mainstream" Canada has meant that Inuit "children and 
adolescents lack adequate role-models, which [has lead] to 
despondency and escapism"33.
Kymlicka’s argument would appear to bring the claims of 
many religious fundamentalist groups as to issues regarding 
censorship and "unnatural sexual practices" within the ambit 
of item (e) of the primary goods list, thus narrowing the gap of 
appropriate/inappropriate claims in the examples of prostest
31 Ibid, p.165 (emphasis added).
32 Ibid, p.165.
33 Ibid, pp. 165-166. Kymlicka cites evidence by A. Seltzer: "Acculturalation 





























































































activity we have discussed. But the "right to cultural
membership" is advanced on the following proviso:
The primary good being recognized [in cultural membership] 
is the cultural community as a context of choice, not the 
character of the community or its traditional ways of life, 
which people are free to endorse or reject34.
It is claimed that in assessing claims to cultural membership 
we must distinguish between:
(1) what goes to the "stability of a cultural community", where 
"culture" is defined in terms of "the existence of a viable 
community of individuals with a shared heritage (language, 
history etc)", that which, according to Kymlicka’s argument, 
establishes the cultural community as a structure of choice', 
and,
(2) the "character of the [cultural] community or its traditional 
ways of life" at "a particular moment", where "culture" is 
defined in terms of "the norms currently characterizing it, so 
that, by definition, any significant change in people’s religious 
affiliations thereby ’destroys’ the old ’culture”'35.
It would therefore be an "abuse" of the right to cultural 
membership to use the argument from the "social basis of self- 
respect" to protect (2) rather than (1). We are reminded that 
both Lord Devlin and Iranian fundamentalists have committed 
this abuse by arguing — "inappropriately" — that without 
restrictions on the freedom of sexual practices (Devlin) or 
freedoms of sexual practice, religion, press, and speech (Iranian
34 Ibid, p.172.




























































































fundamentalists), their respective cultures would disintegrate 
thus undermining the self-respect of their members36.
Given that most religious fundamentalist communities claim 
that the good has already been indicated to them by an 
external source — their religion — which has defined such 
issues as family role models, sexual practices and cosmological 
orientations (eg. belief in "creation" instead of "evolution") as 
the modes for its achievement, it is not immediately obvious 
that what goes to the "stability" of a culture is capable of 
being formulated on the basis of the (liberal) principle of free 
choice. The processes of alternative role-model consideration 
and life-plan revision envisaged by Rawlsian liberalism are 
alien to a life which is lived according to "givens" which have 
not, are not, and ought not (according to their self-referential 
logic) ever be chosen. Indeed, as Galston has noted, 
fundamentalists "might well declare that the best human life 
requires the capacity to receive an external good (God’s truth) 
rather than to form a conception of the good for oneself, and to 
hold fast to that truth once received rather than to revise it"37. 
Furthermore, whereas it might be possible to distinguish, in a
36 Ibid, p.168. In The Enforcement of Morals (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1965), Devlin argued against the liberalization of English 
homosexuality laws on the basis of the protection of public morality. 
Kymlicka claims that it is "wildly implausible to suppose that allowing 
individuals freedom of religion or sexual practices would lead to the 
breakdown of that community, be it England or Iran". (op.cit, p.168). But 
it is telling that after a book-long argument on the protection of minority 
cultures (eg. American Indians), Kymlicka draws upon the protection of 
the majority culture in England as an example. (Whether the structures of 
Iranian society would break down or not, when subjected to the challenge 
of liberalization, is open to speculation).




























































































sociological analysis (and should uncontroversial time-frames 
and cohort analysis figures be found), certain stable features of 
a culture from its more transitory ones, it is not obvious that 
within fundamentalist religious communities issues such as 
religious belief, family structure and sexual practices would 
belong to the latter category. Rather, it seems that they are 
the core stabilizing values of such communities.
If we are to review Rawls’ distinction between acts of 
intolerance and acts of civil disobedience, we notice that it 
relies on the ability to draw the distinction between admissible 
and inadmissible claims legitimately. To establish the 
legitimacy of the right, Rawls relies on a legitimate distinction 
between political conceptions of justice (admissible) and general 
and comprehensive conceptions of justice (inadmissible). But 
this distinction is again deontological, for it is only from within 
the right-as-the-political conception of justice that the 
distinction may be drawn. Kymlicka, recognizing the
shortcomings of traditional liberal individualist methodology 
takes us one distinction further: he de-emphasises the
distinction between political and comprehensive doctrines, but 
in turn requires a legitimate distinction between factors going 
to the stability of a culture, and factors relating to its 
contemporary character in order to legitimate the 
admissible/inadmissible distinction. At no stage in this process 
is the question of legitimacy unequivocally resolved. Kymlicka 
brings us perhaps closer to the rationale of this process. 
Addressing his own addition to the history of liberal 
distinctions, he claims that
To reject the possibility of making this distinction is not




























































































rights within liberalism, it is to give up the possibility of 
defending liberalism itself88.
But if the defence of this brand of liberalism is only justified 
as its own end, the call to the barricades fails to convince. We 
turn rather to the source of this conceptual innovation in the 
structural paradox of liberal impartiality.
2.2 "Incommensurability" and the Liberal Paradox
Through our review of the distinction between a case of civil 
disobedience and a case of intolerance, we have noted that the 
legitimacy of the distinction is established upon the 
assumption that both parties to the conflict - the public 
prosecutor and the protest group - accept the priority of the 
Rawlsian principles of justice ("the right") to any particular 
conception of "the good". But since conflicts of this type involve 
disagreements about the very nature of the right, this 
assumption involves a paradox in the construction of the 
argument for the priority of the right. On the one hand, we 
are lead to believe that, notwithstanding the differences in 
their concepts of the good, citizens are capable of reasoning 
from within their individual general and comprehensive 
doctrines towards a list of primary goods which grounds an 
overlapping consensus on a political concept of justice:
Since we assume each citizen to affirm some such view [viz.
religious, philosophical or moral view] we hope to make it





























































































reasonable, from the standpoint of their own comprehensive 
view, whatever it may be39.
On the other hand, we are reminded that "justice is prior to 
the good in the sense that it limits the admissible conceptions 
of the good, so that those conceptions the pursuit of which 
violate the principles of justice are ruled out absolutely"40.
Now, if certain concepts of the good are to be ruled out (no 
less than absolutely) by the right, which is itself said to have 
been affirmed from within these various concepts of the good, 
how may the right be said to be prior to the good? The 
question is perhaps more familiar to us in the form "How can 
the chicken come before the egg ... when the egg comes before 
the chicken?"
Two resolutions of the paradox of the priority of the right 
offer themselves for consideration: an argument from temporal 
priority, and an argument from logical priority. In A Theory of 
Justice the priority of the right seems to involve both temporal 
and logical arguments. The original position is said to enable 
its parties
to be impartial, even between persons who are not 
contemporaries but who belong to many generations. Thus 
to see our place in society from the perspective of this 
position is to see it sub specie aeternitatis: it is to regard 
the human situation not only from all social but also from 
all temporal points of view41.
39 " o c ”, p.13, and sec. V passim.





























































































The original position is thus both a process which involves a 
"certain form of thought and feeling that rational persons 
[could] adopt within the world"42, and a thought position which 
stands outside historical time in so far as it enables the 
perception of the diversity of conceptions of the good in human 
society to be carried out sub specie aeternitatis. The ordering of 
the right over the good achieved from the "standpoint of 
eternity" is thus introduced into the dimension of historical 
time as a fait accompli*3.
Rawls has now abandoned the argument for the priority of 
the right in the "standpoint of eternity" due to criticisms of 
transcendentalism44. He now conceives the priority of the right 
over the good to refer to the result of a process of reflection on 
justice which refers to, and occurs within, defined spatio- 
temporal parameters. The priority of the right is now the 
justification for the principles which effect the task of 
interpersonal comparisons required of a system of justice in
12 Ibid.
43 The flexibility permitted by Rawls’ principle of "reflective equilibrium" 
(TJ, pp.48-51) only allows for the adjustment of the right upon the 
clearing up of "distortions” or "irregularities" in our "considered 
judgments" as citizens. It involves no challenge to the actual ordering of 
the good and the right.
14 Summary statements of the major "communitarian" critiques by Charles 
Taylor, Michael Walzer, Michael Sandel and Alasdair MacIntyre are 
offered by Amy Gutman, "Communitarian Critiques of Liberalism" in 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 14 (1985), pp.308-322, Stephen Mulhall in 
"The Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism" in European Journal of 
Sociology 28 (1987), pp.269-295, and Allen E. Buchanan,"Assessing the 
Communitarian Critique of Liberalism" in Ethics 99 (1989), pp.852-882. 
For a concise exposition of the "shifts" in Rawls’ thinking see Richard J. 
Ameson’s "Introduction" to the "Symposium on Rawlsian Theory of 
Justice: Recent Developments" in Ethics 99 (1989), pp.695-710 at pp.696- 




























































































the "historical and social conditions of modern democratic 
societies"46. These conditions are:
(i) the fact of pluralism;
(ii) the fact of its permanence;
(iii) the fact that this pluralism can be overcome only by 
the oppressive use of state power;
(iv) the condition of moderate scarcity; and
(v) the possibility of gains from well-organized social 
cooperation.
The recognition of the conditions of pluralism [(i)-(iii)] is 
therefore a necessary condition not only for the definition of 
the right, but also for its normative force, i.e. that which 
grants it the power to legitimately distinguish between 
conceptions of the good which raise "admissible" claims and 
those conceptions of the good which raise "inadmissible" 
claims46.
It would therefore seem reasonable to ask how the fact of
pluralism is understood in political terms. Rawls’ answer takes
the form of claiming that a workable conception of justice
must allow for a diversity of general and comprehensive 
doctrines, and for the plurality of conflicting, and indeed 
incommensurable, conceptions of the meaning, value and 
purpose of human life (or what I shall call for short
«  "OC" p.22. Although the circumstances of justice are a fundamental 
assumption of the Rawlsian opus, their explicit historicization has only 
occurred in the later articles. See eg. comments by William Galston, 
"Pluralism...", op. cit. and Jean Hampton, "Political Philosophy...", op. cit. 
The following list is based on the exposition in "OC", p.22.
46 That this condition is necessary is in accordance with Rawls’ dictum 
that "political philosophy is related to politics because it must be 
concerned, as moral philosophy need not be, with practical political 




























































































‘conceptions of the good’) affirmed by the citizens of 
democratic societies47
The use of the notion of the "incommensurability" of the 
conceptions of the good to describe the circumstances of justice 
is significant. Although Rawls seems to hesitate with respect 
to the precise meaning of incommensurability, he alots the 
concept a key position in his theory. In the footnote to the 
passage above, he holds that:
It is a disputed question whether and in what sense 
conceptions of the good are incommensurable. For our 
purposes here, incommensurability is to be understood as an 
aspect of the fact of pluralism: namely, the fact that there 
is no available political understanding as to how to 
commensurate these conceptions for settling questions of 
political justice"48.
In an earlier article, Rawls asks us to conceive of the 
circumstances of justice in terms of a society where two 
opposing groups regard each other’s way of life "with distaste 
and aversion, if not contempt”. The groups are said to have 
"conceptions of the good [which] are incommensurable because 
their final ends and aspirations are so diverse, their specific 
content so different, that no common basis for judgment can be 
found"49. We identify this position as Rawls’ "social premise" of 
incommensurability.
47 " o c ,  p.4. (emphasis added). The footnote to this passage is reproduced 
below.
48 "OC", p.4, fn.6.




























































































"Incommensurability" in science50 and in ethics has been the 
subject of considerable scholarship. In the context of ethics, 
Steven Lukes has attempted to systematize the concept in the 
following definition:
Two items I, and I2 are incommensurable if and only if, in 
respect of a given variable F, I, is neither superior nor 
inferior to I2, nor are they equal in value51.
The incommensurability of values may therefore be said to 
denote the absence of a scale upon, or a medium through 
which values may be ranked. As such, it has been recognized 
by a number of thinkers in the Anglo-American tradition52. 
Bernard Williams has claimed that there is no "common 
currency" in which certain "gains and losses of value can be 
computed, that values, or at least the most basic values, are 
not only plural, but in a real sense incommensurable"53 *. 
Thomas Nagel has referred to the "fragmentation of value" at 
its source. Having identified five types of value that give rise 
to basic conflict, Nagel holds that their motivation can be 
traced to either agent-centered or outcome-centered 
motivational viewpoints, both of which are "fundamentally
50 The debate between Feyerabend, Putnam etc.
51 Cited from Steven Lukes, "Incommensurability in Science and Ethics" 
(European University Institute: unpub. MS, 1989), p.2 ; Joseph Raz offers 
a similar definition in The Morality o f Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), 
pp.322 & 325.
52 For a recent survey see Lukes op.cit, pp. 9-11 and his "Making Sense of 
Moral Conflict" in Liberalism and the Moral Life ed. Nancy Rosenblum, 
(Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), from which some of the 
following examples are drawn.
53 Bernard Williams: "Conflicts of Values” in Moral Luck (Cambridge:




























































































irreducible to a common basis"54. Charles Larmore has also 
accepted the multiplicity of the sources of value and moves to 
the claim that "not everything is good and right to the extent 
that it is commensurable with respect to any one standard"55.
Rawls’ pronouncements on incommensurability appear to 
agree with all these statements. As Frank Michelman has 
indicated, the premise of a pluralist theory of justice such as 
that of Rawls is a "deep mistrust of people’s capacities to 
communicate persuasively to one another their diverse 
normative experiences: of rights, values and interests, and 
more broadly, interpretations of the world"56 *. However, the fact 
that Rawls arrives at the concept of incommensurability from a 
different direction, namely, from a critique of utilitarianism in 
the discourse of economic theory allows him to take advantage 
of an ambiguity in its use in order to resolve the paradox of 
priority.
Rawls is involved in combatting utilitarian solutions to the 
problem of how diverse bundles of goods may be ranked within 
the framework of a collective rational choice problem.
51 "The Fragmentation of Value” in Mortal Questions (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 129-134. The outcome-centered 
value types are utility and perfectionist ends, while the agent-centered 
values types comprise obligations, general rights, and commitment to one’s 
projects.
55 Charles Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985), p.10
56 "Law’s Republic" in The Yale Law Journal 97 (1988) 1493, at pp.1507 &
1510-1512. Michelman relies on Seyla Benhabib’s account of pluralism in
her Critique, Norm and Utopia (New York: Columbia University Press,




























































































Utilitarianism, whether in its classical form, or in the form of 
"shared higher-order preferences"57, ultimately reduces the 
diverse goods proposed by individual rational actors into a 
"homogenous descriptive magnitude" so that their ranking may 
take the form of a "monotonie transformation of that 
magnitude"68. Stated more simply, utilitarianism comes down 
to a commensurability thesis whereby different and competing 
goods (Ij and I2) may be quantified in respect of the variable 
(F) of utility and thereby ranked according to their respective 
quantities of this unit. The utilitarian commensurability thesis 
comes down to a "thin" description of a rational actor’s 
rankings of utility and his or her expected behaviour upon this 
ranking. The case of the individual rational actor is then 
generalized for all actors within the rational choice problem59. 
This premise, itself controversial within the models of 
theoretical economics60 *, becomes even more controversial within
57 For the movement of contemporary utilitarian thought to this position, 
see Allan Gibbard, "Interpersonal comparisons: preference, good, and the 
intrinsic reward of a life” in Jon Elster & Aanund Hylland, ed., 
Foundations of Social Choice Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1986), pp.165-194. Rawls takes up "shared higher preference" (or 
"coordinal") utility in "SUPG", pp.174-180, where he refers to the accounts 
of the position presented by Kenneth Arrow, "Extended Sympathy and the 
Possibility of Social Choice" Philosophia 7 (1987), pp. 223-237, and Serge 
Kolm, Justice et Equite (Paris: Editions du centre national de la recherche 
scientifique, 1972).
58 See Amartya Sen, On Ethics and Economics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1987), p.61.
59 See eg. Elster & Hylland, op.cit. and Jon Elster: Sour Grapes: Studies 
in the Subversion o f Rationality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1983), Ch. 1.
60 See the classic essay by Amartya Sen: "Rational fools: a critique of the 
behavioural foundations of economic theory" in his Choice, Welfare and




























































































problems of distributive justice in societies containing a 
multiplicity of individual value orientations.
Rawls characterizes utilitarian theories of distributive justice 
as teleological in so far as their conception of the right - that 
which facilitates the solution to the problem of distributive 
justice - is defined as the maximization of the good of more 
utility units61. For Rawls, this involves placing the good before 
the right by defining the right in terms of an independently 
derived good (utility maximization). This solution is 
unacceptable because the necessary premise of 
commensurability must now employ the notion of a "bare 
person" to stabilize its fixed variable (F). The "bare person" 
has no determinate conception of the good to which he or she 
is committed, but rather only a regard for the various desires 
and capacities of the self as "features to be adjusted for the 
highest possible place in the public ranking"62 defined by the 
utility function. This hedonistic account of the person negates 
Rawls’ premises regarding the recognition of pluralism [the 
socio-historical circumstances of justice (i)-(iii)]. It has to be 
rejected by Rawls since
in the circumstances of justice citizens’ conceptions of the 
good are not only said to be opposed but to be 
incommensurable. These conceptions are incommensurable 
because persons are regarded as moved not only by the two 
highest-order interests in developing and exercising their 
moral powers, but also by a determinate conception of the
61 Will Kymlicka (1988) "Rawls on Teleology and Deontology" in 17 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, pp. 173-190) claims that Rawls is fighting 
a "straw man", since the most interesting contemporary theories of 





























































































good, that is, a conception defined by definite ends and 
aspirations, and by particular attachments and loyalties and 
the like63.
To accept the utilitarian notion of the person would therefore 
involve
the dissolution of the person as leading a life expressive of 
character and of devotion to specific final ends and adopted 
(or affirmed) values which define the distinctive points of 
view associated with different (and incommensurable) 
conceptions of the good64.
It is in the defence of this second person - the holder of an 
incommensurable conception of the good - against the "bare 
person” of utilitarianism which is held to deprive individuals of 
their "individuality", and specifically their "moral autonomy"65, 
that Rawls makes the right prior to the good. He achieves this 
through the use of the Kantian notion of autonomy which 
grounds the right in a notion of the moral personality as "free" 
and "equal".
The paradox of the priority of the right over the good is 
therefore "solved" through a switch in argumentation 
strategies. Rawls takes up a deontological argument in an 
attempt to remain true to the socio-historical premises of his 
theory of justice [conditions (i)-(iii)]. He employs the Kantian 
notion of autonomy to define the characteristics of moral
63 "SUPG", p.179 (emphasis added).
84 "SUPG”, p.181 (emphasis added).
65 "SUPG", pp.180-182 offers the clearest account of this critique, 




























































































personality regarded as inherent in every citizen of a modern 
democratic society. In this way, every citizen may be regarded 
as a "free and equal moral person". But in so doing, Rawls 
moves beyond the spatio-temporal parameters of such societies 
to a notion of moral personality, which defends the difference 
of persons. Upon this Kantian terrain Rawls unwittingly erects 
a new thesis of commensurability in interpersonal comparsions 
on the basis of a deontologically derived primary goods thesis. 
He saddles the autonomous Kantian subject with the whole list 
of primary goods necessary for survival in the democratic 
constitutional state. For as we have seen in the previous 
section, it is none other than the needs of this "free and equal 
moral person" - with his or her sense of justice and capacity to 
form and revise a rational life-plan - that determines the 
composition of the list of primary goods.
Rawls’ acceptance of incommensurability is thus only possible 
upon the premise that it is the (Kantian) "free and equal 
moral person” that may hold an incommensurable conception 
of the good. But if this is so, this type of incommensurability 
diverges from what we have identified as the "social premise” 
of incommensurabity. What is now being defended can only 
refer to an incommensurability which stops short of 
challenging the recognition of items on the list of primary 
goods. A subject who has an unchallengeable need for a 
specified list of primary goods can no longer be autonomous in 
the Kantian sense. This second form of incommensurability 
may only be regarded as incommensurability "admissible" to 
the just society. By switching between the social premise of 




























































































incommensurability, Rawls resolves the priority of the right by 
allowing the role of the former conception to be determined by 
the deontological argument grounding the latter.
Rawls’ restriction of incommensurability is a further 
instantiation of the classical charge that the list of primary 
goods is itself a determinate (albeit minimal) conception of the 
good. Rawls, particularly in his later articles, has not denied 
that the right contains some conception of the good. As we 
have noted, he defines this minimal conception of primary 
goods as the "political good of a well-ordered society"66, and he 
distinguishes it from inadmissible conceptions of the good 
derived from general and comprehensive doctrines. But since 
the distinction between admissible and inadmissible is itself 
raised from the standpoint of the right, it begs the question of 
its own legitimacy.
Rawls’ perserverance with this distinction reduces the 
credibility of his claim to uphold the fact of pluralism 
[represented in conditions (i)-(iii)]. The crushing force of such 
a deontologically determined distinction upon the social 
premises of the theory may be observed more clearly if we 
return to the distinction between a case of intolerance and a 
case of civil disobedience. According to Rawls, it should make 
no difference to the theory of justice whether those that come 
before an institution of justice hold incommensurable 





























































































the principles of political justice secures the list of primary 
goods as a legitimate basis for interpersonal comparisons.
If however we adopt Rawls’ social premise of
incommensurability rather than the meagre measure of 
incommensurability conceded to the Kantian moral person as- 
Rawlsian-citizen, the legitimacy of the deontologically derived 
appropriate/inappropriate distinction and this second notion of 
"admissible incommensurability" becomes questionable. We may 
now reconstruct Rawls’ mode of conflict resolution in the 
following way:
V  Claims 
N . raised
Concep- 
tions o f  \ .  
the G ood Inappropriate Appropriate
Commensurable A. Normal Case 1 B. Normal Case2 
Civil Disobedience
Incommensurable C. Intolerance D. X X X
[Table 1]
Assuming that the state continues to raise an 
appropriate claim of justice, two possibilities of a "normal case" 
arise (Positions A and B). In these cases, the parties’ 
conceptions of the good involve conflicting claims which may be 
sorted out by their common acceptance of the primary goods 





























































































between appropriate/inappropriate retains its legitimacy on the 
basis of this consensus. Appropriate claims trump 
inappropriate claims67. Now, a case involving a party that 
comes to a conflict on the basis that its conception of the good 
is incommensurable with certain items on the list of primary 
goods, does not lend itself to this analysis. It is structurally 
impossible for such actors to raise an "appropriate" claim to 
justice. Upon the social premise of incommensurability, which 
both we and Rawls hold to characterize a growing number of 
modern social conflict situations, Rawls’ model renders these 
actors’ claims inadmissible (Position D). Cases of so termed 
"intolerance" are therefore recognized as stemming from 
incommensurable concepts of the good but remain inadmissible 
(Position C). But cases of civil disobedience are only prima 
facie regarded as raising inadmissible claims stemming from 
incommensurable concepts of the good (Position C). They are 
carried over into Position B - "normalized" only by the switch 
between the social premise of incommensurability and the 
notion of "admissible" incommensurability.
61 It is important, but incidental to this argument, that Rawls offers no 
account of how two appropriate claims to justice referring to different 
items on the relatively heterogenous list of primary goods may be weighed 
against each other. His discussion of indexing primary goods in the 
"difference principle" (whereby the social order is prohibited from securing 
the advantages of the "better off" unless doing so is to the advantage of 
the "less fortunate") only concretizes the possibility of indexing in the case 
of the redistribution of income in the just society. This is a discussion 
premised on the capacity to quantify distributive shares in the economy 
(cf. TJ, pp. 152-161, pp. 174-5). The premise of quantification — the 
premise of utilitarian approaches to distributive justice -- is more difficult 
to sustain in a conflict between eg. primary goods list items (e) "the social 
basis of self-respect" and item (d) "income and wealth". To our knowledge, 
no attempt has been made to provide an internal "application discourse" 




























































































Thus the legitimacy of the distinction between civil 
disobedience and intolerance comes down to a resolution of the 
priority paradox which betrays pluralism in terms of a 
consistent commitment to a liberal position, something which 
amounts to promoting a determinate conception of the good. 
Consistency requires that one either changes theory to conform 
to practice, or changes practice to conform to theory. "If we 
manipulate theory in order to conform to practices that seem 
sound to us, theory becomes nothing more than a pliable tool 
of rationalization"68. Manipulation in a theory of justice, is even 
more pernicious. For if put into operation, the theory changes 
practice.
3.1 Habermas and Primary Goods
The dangers of privileging a list of primary goods within a 
theory of justice have long been recognized by Habermas. In 
Communication and the Evolution of Society he claims that to 
secure primary goods such as money, free time and security as 
neutral means ("media") for the attainment of a "multiplicity of 
concrete ends selected according to values" - the project of 
Rawlsian liberalism - is only to secure the circumscribed 
opportunity structures of "possessive individualism". Media 
such as these only provide the necessary conditions for the life 
of private, isolated commodity owners who are linked together




























































































by means of an exchange economy69. The Kantian derived 
assumption of the private autonomous subject which fuels such 
projects leaves them firmly within the bonds of bourgeois 
ideology70. Habermas himself requires the step beyond the 
Kantian subject to inter-subjectivity in the social realm of the 
life-world, a step he takes through the use of George Herbert 
Mead’s notion of the "ideal taking over of roles" between 
subjects.
Habermas’ critique parallels long standing Anglo-American 
critiques concerning the assumption of a "liberal individualist 
self within the notion of primary goods71. But he goes much 
further in the following way:
"I doubt ... whether the form of life mirrored in system- 
conforming rewards [of the exchange economy] can today — 
in the light of the alternatives opened by capitalist 
development itself - still be as convincingly legitimated as it 
could in Hobbes’ time."72
Habermas claims that capitalist society generates new forms of 
life which cannot simply be contained or legitimated within the
69 "Legitimation Problems in the Modern State" in Communication and the 
Evolution of Society (London: Heinmann, 1979), p.198. Habermas cites 
C.B. McPherson’s formulation of the ideology of "possessive individualism".
70 Habermas, "Gerechtigkeit und Solidaritat" in W. Edelstein and G. 
Nunner-Winkler (eds.) Zur Bestimmung der Moral (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 1986), p. 307. On the validity of this critique with respect to 
Kant, see the debate stemming from Max Adler, Kant und der Marxismus 
(1925), Reprint (Aalen: Scientia,1975).
71 One of the earliest and well-known criticisms came from Thomas Nagel: 
"Rawls on Justice" reprinted in Reading Rawls: Critical Studies on Rawls’ 
"A Theory of Justice" (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975). This line became the 
mainsty of the so-termed "communitarian" criticisms of Michael Walzer, 
Michael Sandel and Charles Taylor (see fn.44 above).
72 "Historical Materialism and the Development of Normative Structures" 




























































































parameters offered by an exchange economy. These 
"alternative" forms of life are related to the possibility of a 
value universalism which might lead to a form of the "pursuit 
of happiness" which would not merely consist in the 
accumulation of "material objects of which one disposes 
privately, but [in the] bringing about [of] social relations in 
which mutuality predominates and satisfaction does not mean 
the triumph of one over the repressed needs of the other”71. 
Given this process, the use of primary goods as a basis for the 
regulation of interpersonal conflicts within such societies is 
rejected for two reasons.
Firstly, as we have noted in our discussion of Rawls, many of 
the demands arising from these new forms of life cannot easily 
be managed through the classical mechanisms of distributive 
justice theory (eg. Rawls’ "difference principle"). Drawing upon 
the "new politics" and "post-material values" scholarship of 
Inglehart, Hildebrand and Dalton, Barnes and Kaase, 
Habermas has recognized that many of the conflicts that have 
developed in advanced Western societies deviate from the 
welfare state pattern of institutionalized conflict over 
distribution. These conflicts do not occur in the domains of 
material reproduction, but rather arise in domains of cultural 
reproduction, social integration and socializaton:
they are carried out in subinstitutional - or at least
extraparliamentary - forms of protest, and the underlying 73*
73 Ibid, p.199. Habermas makes reference to utilitarian theories which
allow for sacrificing one person’s good because it maximizes happiness 
overall. For a criticism which takes this as a misdescription of 





























































































deficits reflect a reification of communicatively structured 
domains of action that will not respond to the media of 
money and power. The issue is not primarily one of 
compensations that the welfare state can provide, but of 
defending and restoring endangered ways of life. In short, the 
new conflicts are not ignited by distribution problems but by 
questions having to do with the grammar of forms of life74.
Social movements in advanced western societies, are not 
primarily concerned with a re-distribution of wealth but with a 
redefinition of national and international issues which have to 
do with justice, eg. the location of nuclear power plants, 
missile installations, education and abortion debates, 
censorship, urban development. Their very nature does not 
allow them to be dealt with through a distributive mechanism 
premised on the mechanisms of the exchange economy.
Secondly, Habermas’ adoption of a stronger rationality thesis 
than that used by Rawls’ members of the "overlapping 
consensus" (or "choosers" in the "original position"), eliminates 
the need for a base of interpersonal comparisons as imperfect 
as the primary goods thesis. Unlike most thinkers in the 
Anglo-American liberal tradition, Habermas does not take the 
autonomous individual as a starting point for his analysis, but 
rather the discursive intersubjective relations which obtain 
between human beings in the "life-world"75 *. The life-world is 
characterised by a rationality of its own which is 
communicative and consensus-oriented. The rules of this
74 The Theory of Communicative Action vol.II (Cambridge: Polity, 1987), 
p.392, (hereinafter cited as TCA vol. II). Cf. also "Litmus Test", p.110.
75 Cf. Habermas, "Gerechtigkeit und Solidaritàt" in W. Edelstein and G.
Nunner-Winkler (eds.) Zur Bestimmung der Moral (Suhrkamp: Frankfurt 




























































































discourse require that consensus must be achieved by means of 
the better argument alone, which is to say that all forms of 
domination and violence are excluded. Claims raised in 
communicative action are validated through the internal 
validity claims of illocutionary speech acts76. Opposed to the 
life-world is the "system" which Habermas divides into the 
subsystems of economy and politics. The latter work according 
to their own internal logic, and are steered by the media of 
money and power respectively. Whereas the rationality of the 
life-world is characterized by communicative action, the 
rationality of the system is goal-oriented and characterised by 
instrumental-strategical action. In Kantian shorthand: in the 
world of the system people treat themselves as means to an 
end, whereas in the life-world they also treat themselves as 
ends in themselves.
These two spheres of society stand opposed to each other. At 
their intersection stands law which belongs to both and 
expresses the ongoing battle between them. This double 
character of law is captured by Habermas in his distinction 
between law as a medium and law as an institution” . Law as 
a medium belongs to the system, and expresses the needs of 
systemic imperatives - the functioning of the economy and 
political administration. Law as an institution belongs to the 
life-world, in so far as the normative bases of constitutional
76 For Habermas’ classification of speech acts and the discussion of the 
validity claims raised by illocutionary speech acts see The Theory of 
Communicative Action vol.I, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984), pp.286-337, 
(hereinafter cited as TCA, vol.I). 7




























































































law, and of the principles of criminal law and penal procedure 
cannot be sufficiently legitimized through a positivistic 
reference to their conformity to legal procedure (i.e. through 
self-reference). Rather, the legitimation of these norms require 
"substantive justification" since they "belong to the legitimate 
orders of the lifeworld itself and, together with informal norms 
of conduct, form the background of communicative action"78. 
Substantive justification thus necessitates an "internal 
connection" between law and morality, in which morality 
derives its normative force from the satisfaction of the validity 
claims raised in communicative action within the life-world. In 
this fashion, law as an institution (life-world), legitimates the 
use of law as a medium (system) in politics, where law is 
called upon to legitimate the executive enforcement of 
adjudication79.
It is now clear that when Habermas comes to explain how 
law may be called upon to regulate interpersonal conflict80 *, he 
need not defend the impartiality and legitimacy of the "right" 
by requiring all successful claims to the "right" to refer to a 
list of primary goods (Rawlsian admissibility/inadmissibility). 
He only requires such claims to meet the validity conditions 
that would be required of norms proposed under the "ideal 
taking over of roles" in communicative action. Habermas
78 TCA, vol.II, p.365.
79 Habermas, "Law and Morality", p. 274.: "it must be shown how the 
moral point of view of impartial judgment can be stabilized from within 
positive law itself' See also "Towards a Communication-Concept...".
80 Law’s other task being the "pursuit of collective goals and programs",
the conceptual distinction being established most clearly in Habermas,




























































































therefore requires that through a discourse of justification each
valid norm satisfy the "(U)" principle:
dafi die Folgen und Nebenwirkungen, die sich jeweils aus 
ihrer allgemeinen Befolgung fur die Befriedigung der 
Interessen eines jeden Einzelenen (voraussichtlich) ergeben, 
von alien Betroffenen akzeptiert (und den Auswirkungen der 
bekannten alternativen Regelungsmoglichkeiten vorgezogen) 
werden konnen81.
The "internal connection" between law and morality offered by 
the (U) principle is motivated by Habermas’ desire to defend 
the lifeworld against the threat of its "colonization" by the 
imperatives of the (economic and political) system which find 
expression through law as a medium. This is the theory’s 
normative standpoint. The form of rationality it requires is not 
only referable to a theory of psychological development - which 
Habermas has attempted to provide82 - but also to a particular 
phase of historical development, that of modernity whose ideal 
of freedom, equality and fraternity spearhead the project of 
human emancipation83. Bourgeois society develops new forms of 
life which are based on a universalization of the values of 
modernity. In so far as they contain a promise to realize 
modernity’s emancipatory potential, Habermas acknowledges 
the importance of specific social movements and, furthermore,
81 Jürgen Habermas, "Diskursethik - Notizien zu einem 
Begründungsprogram" in Moralbewufltsein und kommunikatives Handeln, 
pp.53-126, at pp.75-76. Hereinafter we shall refer to this principle through 
its accepted abbreviation "(U)\
82 "Moral Development and Ego Identity" in Communication and the 
Evolution o f Society (op.cit.) and the title essay of Moralbewufistein und 
kommunikatives Handeln (op.cit.) pp. 127-205.
83 See eg. Jürgen Habermas, "Volkssouverânitât als Verfahren: Ein 
normativer Begriff von Offentlichkeit” in Merkur 43 (1989), pp.465-477 





























































































of the specific values they propose. By returning to the 
distinction between cases of civil disobedience and cases of 
socio-political pathology, we shall examine how he attempts the 
delicate balance between the impartiality of a legal procedure 
designed to secure the plurality of modernity’s life forms and 
the privileging of modernity’s emancipatory character through 
law.
3.2 Civil Disobedience: Applying the distinction
On the occasion of the Pershing missile protests in the Federal 
Republic of Germany in the early 1980’s, Habermas claimed 
that civil disobedience is "among the indispensible necessities 
of a mature political culture"84. As a category, civil 
disobedience "must remain suspended between legitimacy and 
legality" since the citizen’s obedience to the political authority 
of the democratic constitutional state ought not, in Habermas’ 
view, be reducible to the positive law’s sanctioning of such 
authority, but only to the legitimacy of the same. Habermas 
explicitly adopts Rawls’ necessary conditions for a successful 
claim to civil disobedience: The acts must be a "public", 
"symbolic" and "non-violent" and must amount to a 
"premeditated transgression of individual legal norms" with the 
sole "intention of appealing to the capacity for insight and the 
sense of justice of the relevant majority”85. Furthermore, 
Habermas seems to indicate that the disputed policy must be
e< Habermas, "Litmus Test", p.106.
85 Ibid, pp.100-102. See also Stephen K. White, The Recent work o f Jurgen 




























































































one which will have relatively irreversible consequences or 
which involves a "confrontation of different forms of life"86. The 
defence of the civil disobedience category extends so far as to 
create an exception to the liberal democratic principle of 
majority rule, since this principle may lead (and already has 
lead) to a tyranny of an errant majority over an enlightened 
minority. Habermas pleads for a reflexive practicing of this 
rule87, which is to say that in a case of civil disobedience, the 
majority ought to limit itself in exercising its majoritarian 
rights against civil dissidents.
Given Habermas’ recent movement towards the parallel but 
distinct use of discourses of justification (Begrundungsdiskurse) 
and discourses of application (Anwendungsdiskurse) in law88 *, 
his treatment of civil disobedience might be reconstructed in 
the following way: As with Rawls, a successful plea of civil 
disobedience involves the claim to apply, in a given situation, a 
newly-proposed norm of justice which collides with an existing 
norm considered applicable to the situation. To this extent the 
newly-proposed norm is prima facie invalid. Both norms would 
be removed to a discourse of justification facilitated through 
the discursive rules of communicative action. Here, rights to 
cultural membership cannot be validated unless they are
86 "Litmus Test”, pp.110-111 in the context of the missiles protest.
87 Drawing on the work of Claus Offe, "Legitimation Through Majority 
Rule?” in C. Offe Disorganized Capitalism: Contemporary Transformations 
o f Work and Politics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), pp. 259-299.
88 In the context of the theory of communicative action, the distinction 
between the two levels of discourse has been introduced by Giinther, Der
Sinn fur Angemessenheit: Anwendungsdiskurse in Moral und Recht 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1988) and adopted by Habermas in "Law 




























































































compatible with the (U) principle89. In cases of civil 
disobedience, both norms would be valid if they satisfy the (U) 
principle. The collision of norms would therefore be "external" 
since it would not involve their respective validity90. The 
collision would now become a matter for the discourse of 
application, which no longer deals with the validity of the 
norms, but only with the appropriateness of their respective 
application in the given situation under conditions of local and 
temporal constraint. The valid norm thus raised through civil 
disobedience would be accomodated through a "realignment" or 
"re-ordering" of the (already validated) norms of the legal 
system.
A case of social pathology may be distinguished from a case 
of civil disobedience in that it involves an "internal collision" of 
norms on the level of the discourse of justification. Whereas an 
existing legal norm would satisfy the (U) principle, the norm 
advanced by a "pathological" life form would not. The collision 
would result in the existing norm’s victory and its subsequent 
application in the given situation.
This analysis permits us to describe a potential collision 
between a norm raised by a group of religious fundamentalists
89 In the context of a conflict between the democratic majority rule 
principle and minoritarian claims, Habermas holds that "There should be 
no minorities by birth, for instance on the basis of separate cultural 
traditions and identities”, in "Litmus Test", p .l l l .
90 This classification is used by Klaus Gunther in "Ein Normativer Begriff 
der Koharenz fur eine Theorie der Juristischen Argumentation" in 
Rechtstheorie 20 (1989), pp.163-190, at pp. 168-170 upon a modification of 
a distinction introduced by Robert Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte (Baden- 




























































































and the norm of majority rule as coming down to the fact that: 
(1) The norms of religious fundamentalism are not 
universalizable as (U) requires; because (2) religious 
fundamentalism has a lower form of rationality that is 
inherently hostile to the conditions of communicative action, 
and is displayed through "withdrawal" from, or even resistance 
to, the public sphere91. By way of contrast, if one of the so- 
termed "new social movements" was to commit acts of civil 
disobedience, it would most likely (1) be capable of proposing 
universalizable norms and; (2) display a degree of rationality 
that promises to realize the emancipatory potential of 
communicative action. Habermas’ recognition of this potential 
in the "new social movements" would therefore allow us to 
distinguish the problematic case of "new" religious 
fundamentalism (eg. "revivalism" in the U.S.A.) even though 
both movements are a reaction to the conditions of modernity. 
As Stephen White notes:
from Habermas’s perspective, social movements are reacting 
against the increasing colonization of the lifeworld and 
cultural impoverishment. This perspective allows one to 
understand the peculiar defensive quality such movements 
exhibit. On the one hand, there is a defensive reaction 
against the encroachment of the state and economy on 
society, something which is similar to traditionalistic, 
reactive movements. On the other hand, the behavior of 
new social movements cannot be understood simply as a 
reaction against the ‘destruction of traditional forms of life’, 
but rather as a reaction against the deformation of 
‘posttraditional forms of life’ made possible by a rationalized 
lifeworld. Protecting the conditions of possible
‘communicative sociation’ means generating space for more
91 See TCA, vol. II, pp.392-396. Cf. White, op.cit., p. 124ff.; cf. also Offe, 




























































































autonomous construction of group identity and political
deliberation92.
This may hold for the distinction between a "new social 
movement" and U.S. revivalism. But what of the increasingly 
problematic case of islamic fundamentalism? Whereas the first 
type of fundamentalism partakes in the system’s manipulative 
use of mass-media such as television, the second largely does 
not. But neither are carriers of emancipatory potential since 
they rely on traditional forms of life.
The very ability to draw this distinction between forms of 
rationality (and hence between cases of civil disobedience and 
pathology, new social movements and religious 
fundamentalism) ultimately depends on the solution to the 
following paradox: The impartial regulation of interpersonal 
conflicts from the standpoint of justice ("the right") requires the 
privileging of certain forms of rationality, namely those that 
are capable of arriving at the standpoint of impartiality 
themselves through their emancipatory potential for ideal role 
taking (the "admissible"). Conversely, those life forms (and the 
"good" they try to achieve) which are incompatible with the 
modes of rationality capable of achieving the "moral point of 
view" (strategies of withdrawal or resistance) must be excluded 
(the "inadmissible"). Thus we have a paradox similar to that of 
Rawls’ "priority of the right". Habermas must now show, ... 
dare we suggest ... "substantial justification" of his distinction 
between forms of rationality to overcome it.




























































































3.3 The Rationality of Pre-modern Societies
In the Theory o f Communicative Action, Habermas reviews the 
debate between universalists and contextualists which was 
sparked off by Peter Winch93. Although attempting a via 
media, he is nevertheless closer to the universalists’ claim of 
universal standards of rationality than to the relativists’ claim 
that there are unique forms of rationality which are cultural 
context-dependent. It is in this context that he rejects Winch’s 
premise of the incommensurability in value of various life 
forms94, thus distinguishing himself from the social premise of 
incommensurability we have discussed in relation to Rawls. 
Habermas distinguishes between different forms of a so-termed 
"universal rationality", highlighting instrumental and 
communicative rationality. The result of his discussion is that 
the potential of a full rationality cannot reside in pre-modern, 
mystical world-views, but only in western world-views to the 
extent that these societies do not exclusively rest on a 
restricted or distorted version of this rationality. It is only in 
post-traditional cultures that the emancipatory forces of 
communicative action of the life-world may be realized against 
the instrumental reason of the system.
Habermas gives two arguments for this conclusion. The first 
derives from an empirical observation, the second from a 
theoretical scheme. We address both in turn. The first
93 The following discussion is based on TCA Vol.I, ch.l.




























































































argument holds that due to the undeveloped state of their 
productive forces, archaic societies cannot bring risks under 
control. The flood of contingencies stemming from an 
unmastered environment are merely "interpreted away" 
(weginterpretiert)95. This is an indicator for the fact that these 
societies do not address their problems "properly". However, as 
the experience of ecological problems in modern societies 
indicates, exactly the same behavior is found in modern 
societies when they are confronted with unexpected (and 
dangerous) events96. Habermas might well argue that modern 
societies possess the potential for self-correction, whereas 
archaic societies do not. But from the discussion of this 
problem it is rather unlikely to expect a clear answer in 
Habermas’ favour since a large part of the ecologial discourse, 
including the critical scientific community, denies the existence 
of precisely this capacity.
The second argument is to the effect that the differentiation 
of value spheres - most developed in modern societies - is a 
sort of teleological process which gives us the yardstick to 
measure modern and premodern societies and their potentials 
for rationality. For Habermas, social evolution is a process 
which leads to higher stages of rationality97. The totalizing
95 TCA, voi. I, pp.46/47.
96 See Ulrich Beck, Gegengifte. Die organisierte Unverantwortlichkeit 
(Frankfurt am Main, 1988) and Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents (New 
York, 1984).
97 Habermas goes to the extent of comparing "phylogenetic" findings on 
archaic societies with research findings in the "ontogenetical" sphere, 
suggesting that the "socio-centrism" of primitive societies is to be viewed 
as parallel to the problem of the egocentrism of young children in western 




























































































mode of thought in pre-modern societies is unable to draw the 
"familiar (to us) semiotic distinctions between the sign 
substratum of a linguistic expression, its semantic content, and 
the referent to which a speaker can refer with its help"98. 
Based on this interpretation of pre-modern rationality, the 
capacity for rational action orientation in the life-world 
requires that a cultural tradition must, inter alia'.
(a) differentiate its validity claims and make available 
concepts for the objective, social and subjective worlds,
(b) permit a reflective relation to itself, which involves 
stripping itself of dogmatism to permit, in principle, that 
interpretations stored in tradition be placed in question and 
subjected to critical revision,
(c) socially institutionalize its learning processes so as to 
permit a feedback of these processes99.
But if Habermas is to eventually rely on this interpretation of 
rationality to deal with contemporary "traditionalists” such as 
U.S. revivalist groups, there is insufficient empirical evidence 
to suggest that the life-world of such groups is fully 
comparable to that of archaic societies. Furthermore, these 
rationality conditions need not be accepted from a normative 
point of view: distinguishing life forms on the basis of their 
capacity to achieve the rationality required of the "moral point 
of view" is no way to defend the impartiality of the "moral 
point of view" towards all life forms, given that the "moral 































































































We therefore have a less than satisfactory resolution of the 
paradox involving the theory’s demands for impartiality on the 
one hand, and its privileging of certain values on the other. 
The distinction between civil disobedience and political 
pathology is resolved through the claim that only post- 
traditional life-forms harbour the social rationality which 
promises the universalization of emancipatory values. 
According to Habermas, a life form is rational when it allows 
individuals to build up principled moral insights and enhances 
their realization100. In the next section we argue that one of 
these values is "solidarity". By introducing solidarity as a 
substantive element into a theory which gives priority to the 
right, Habermas attempts to resolve the paradox. By invoking 
the theory’s own pronouncements on impartiality, we argue 
that this move merely defers the paradox.
3.4 Solidarity: Moral or Ethical?
Habermas adresses this problem explicitly in his article 
"Gerechtigkeit und Solidaritàt”101 where he acknowledges that 
deontological ethics have largely excluded questions of 
happiness and suffering102 a position which Kohlberg, among
100 "Über Moralitàt und Sittlichkeit - Was macht eine Lebensform 
rational?" in H. Schnâdelbach (ed.) Rationalitat (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 1984), p. 228 (hereinafter cited as "Moralitàt...").
101 In W. Edelstein and G. Nunner-Winkler (eds.) Zur Bestimmung der 
Moral (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986), hereinafter cited as 
"Gerechtigkeit..."





























































































others, has attempted to rectify103. Habermas agrees with 
Kohlberg’s intentions (which he finds "pioneering”), but not 
with the execution of the program. At first sight he seems to 
accept that there is a place for the good within the theory of 
the right104. Habermas differs from Kohlberg in that he does 
not see benevolence, but solidarity as the natural complement 
of justice105. But Habermas is subsequently reluctant to admit 
that he is introducing elements of the good into the theory of 
the right through claiming that his form of post-metaphysical 
thought does not reconcile Kant with Aristotle106. Habermas 
only admits that he attempts to exploit the modern concept of 
justice in order to overcome its individualistic bias by stressing 
solidarity as the obverse of justice, thus introducing to the 
right only those "structural aspects" of the good life which are 
common to all forms of communicative socialization107. Is this 
the resolution of the paradox?
In our view there is a whole array of possible goods which 
stand betwen a "full” notion of the good life (containing the
103 See L. Kohlberg, D. Boyd & Ch. Levine, "Die Wiederkehr der sechsten 
Stufe: Gerechtigkeit, Wohlwollen und der Standpunkt der Moral" in Zar 
Bestimmung der Moral (op.cit.), p.205ff.
104 Cf. "Gerechtigkeit...", op.cit., p. 303.
106 This concept does not seem to be worked out adequately. As Arne J. 
Vetlesen rightly remarks, solidarity at its base must also have an 
emotional feeling of empathy. However, this would presuppose that we are 
able to identify ourselves with human fellows who are oppressed in a 
particular way, i.e. in a way we can have compassion with. It seems 
obvious that the cases of possible solidarity here are much more 
restricted. (Vetlesen, "Empathy and Solidarity in Discourse Ethics”, MS., 






























































































ancient elements of cosmic justice) and a "thin" one (which 
only contains solidarity in Habermas’ sense). If post- 
metaphysical thinking is to be the basis for an impartial 
theory of justice - issues such as Kant versus Aristotle put 
aside - Habermas’ project seems to run against the central 
motivation of modern projects for justice, namely, the fact that 
they are designed to avoid the entrance of any form of the 
good into the right, and not simply cosmic views of the good.
In Habermas’ view the principle of universalization (U) serves 
as the cutting edge in distinguishing between admissible and 
inadmissible claims to justice. In applying this principle, can 
we avoid the danger of adjusting the theory to desirable social 
practices? Practices of everyday life do not embody 
intersubjective validity per se. They are only candidates for 
such embodiment. Universalistic morals, therefore, do not deal 
with the prefence ranking of values but with the ought- 
character of norms108. Habermas thus distinguishes between 
morality (Moralitat) and ethical life (Sittlichkeit). The first is 
universal, expressing the moral point of view and evaluating 
questions of the good life hypothetically. The second is the real 
ethical life of a community (life-world) which mainly concerns 
questions of justice and their normative validity. Habermas 
employs the metaphor of universal morals the kernel and the 
forms of ethical life the peel109. He thinks that we cannot 
submit concrete existing ethical forms of life to a moral view 
because individuals who have been brought up in such
108 "Moralitat...", p. 221.




























































































contexts cannot chose the form of life in which they have been 
socialised as they can chose a norm after due reflection110. 
They can only distance themselves in a hypothetical way from 
the values of their community — a virtue which the moral 
point of view recquires.
On the basis of the kernel and peel metaphor, we might 
construct the following relations: Morality stands to ethical life 
just as justice to the good life, and these like the normative to 
the evaluative. It is not very clear if in all three cases the 
former serves as a measure for the latter. Habermas is explicit 
only with respect to morality and ethical life where the former 
serves as a yardstick to judge on the latter. In a discussion 
with Rudiger Bubner Habermas defends his viewpoint that one 
needs a reference point outside concrete existing ethical life- 
forms in order to critically examine them. This is indispensable 
if one wishes, like Bubner, to trace rationality in real existing 
ethical communities111. But Habermas does not extend this 
reasoning to the relation between the good life and justice. 
Here he simply states that they are "complementary" or even 
two aspects of the same112 *. This is so because the
110 CC'Moralitat...", p. 222. But evaluative questions ("Fragen des guten 
Lebens") are not "theoriefâhig", because they are not, as normative 
questions are, accessible to rational and binding discussions, cf. 
"Gerechtigkeit und Solidaritât..", p. 304. See, also, TCA, vol IL, p. 109.
111 Cf. Bubner, "Rationalitat, Lebensform und Geschichte", in H. 
Schnâdelbach (ed.) Rationalitat. Frankfurt, 1984, pp. 198-217; see also 
Habermas, "Moralitât...", p. 233 ff.
112 "Die deontologisch begriffene Gerechtigkeit fordert als ihr Anderes
Solidaritât. Dabei handelt es sich nicht so sehr um zwei Momente, die





























































































communicative structure of social life provides both the 
possibility for just arrangements as for solidaristic behaviour. 
The fragile identity of individuals can only be stabilized 
reciprocally and in the maintainance of the group’s identity. 
From this, Habermas concludes the existence of a close 
relationship between care for the well-being of the neighbour 
and the interest in the common welfare, a principle with a 
universalistic dimension113. Habermas therefore seems to assign 
a big task to the concept of solidarity since for him, this 
means not only to care for the well-being of the fellows of one 
community and one life-form, but also to care for the global 
collectivity. For Habermas, arguments (as such) reach beyond 
particular life-worlds — to everything which has a human 
face114.
It seems that Habermas has succeeded in avoiding the 
paradox of impartiality by fusing the good with the right by 
attributing to solidarity a deep locus in human nature115. He 
can now claim that solidarity is nothing outside justice but 
only justice under another name. It seems to us, however, that 
this solution burdens the nature of communicative communities 
with too many tasks. As several authors have pointed out,
113 Ibid, p. 310.
111 Ibid., p. 312. For Habermas there is a "GewiBheit der Verschwisterung" 
and an "Element der Versohnung", ibid, p. 313.
115 Cf. the following statement: ”[W]eil Diskurse dem
verstandigungsorientierten Handeln als Reflexionsform gleichsam 
aufsitzen, konnen sie demselben Medium sprachlich vermittelter 
Interaktionen, dem die Individuen ihre Versehrbarkeit verdanken, auch 
die zentralen Gesichtspunkte fur die moralische Kompensation dieser 





























































































Habermas assimilates the nature of a community of 
communication to the nature of a research community116. 
Against such a criticism, Habermas would probably affirm that 
morality is not a local and historical particularism, but 
universal. It is telling that Habermas, in defending this 
approach, makes a reference to Kant (like Rawls) and 
Rousseau, who both developed the notion of autonomy of 
persons117. With this notion we are able to distinguish post- 
conventional conceptions of justice and morals from those of 
traditional societies. But in so doing, Habermas seems to over­
generalize the historically specific forms of (modern) ethical 
life, namely, those theorized by Kant and Rousseau.
3.5 A Critical Political Public of Limited Virtue
Let us look at the paradox from a slightly different angle. 
From Habermas’ early writings onwards, the notion of a 
critical public has always been important. In The Philosophical 
Discourse o f Modernity (1985)118 *he affirms that the "political
116 Karl-Heinz Ilting, for example, pointed out, that "die Bedingungen 
einer methodisch gefiihrten Diskussion und die Bedingungen eines nach 
universalen ethischen und rechtlichen Normen geordneten Zusammen- 
lebens endlicher Vemunftwesen keineswegs zusammenfallen”, see Ilting, 
"Geltung als Konsens", Neue Hefte fiir Philosophic, 1976, p. 29. See also 
Hung’s criticism of K.-O. Apel, whose "Versueh, die Geltung universaler 
moralischer Normen durch Reflexion auf die Voraussetzungen einer 
rationalen Argumentation zu begrunden, besonders problematisch [ist]." 
Ilting, "Der Geltungsgrund moralischer Normen" in W. Kuhlmann & D. 
Bohler (eds.) Kommunikation und Reflexion. Zur Diskussion der 
Transzendentalpragmatik. Antworten auf Karl-Otto Apel (Suhrkamp: 
Frankfurt, 1982), p. 615.
117 "Moralitat und Sittlichkeit...", p. 226.





























































































public sphere, in which complex societies gain a normative 
distance from themselves and are capable to assimilate 
collectively experiences of crises” is different from the political 
system. We do not wish to address the problem of how a 
complex society may be conceived as capable of reflecting on 
itself as a whole"9. We only stress that Habermas himself sees 
a paradoxical task in the practice of the legal consitutional 
state: it must protect and sustain the distrust of injustice that 
appears in legal forms, while ensuring that this distrust 
cannot assume an institutionally secure form. Habermas says: 
"With this idea of non-institutionalized distrust towards itself, 
the idea of the consitutional state stretches beyond the 
ensemble of its particular, positively established regulations." 
How is this resolved ? The answer is: "The paradox finds its 
resolution in a political culture that provides its citizens with 
the sensibility - with the measure of judgement and 
willingness to take risks - which is necessary in transitional 
and exceptional situations to recognize the legal offenses 
against legitimacy and, if need be, to act illegally out of moral 
insight."120
A critical public, a "political culture", is thus the guardian of 
legitimacy. People participating in actions of civil disobedience 
are the corrective which may be necessary in exceptional cases 
of injustice. But how can one be sure where injustice lies? 
How is one to judge if the agents of illegal acts violate
119 Cf. Habermas, "Kônnen komplexe Gesellschaften eine vernünftige 
Identitàt ausbilden?" in Zar Rekonstruktion des historischen Materialismus 
(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1982), esp. pp. 110 ff.




























































































regulations which are legitimate or illegitimate? According to 
Habermas, we do not judge this matter upon some arbitrary 
standard of private morality, of special rights, or of a 
priviledges access to truth121. "Only those moral principles are 
authoritative which are reasonable for all and upon which the 
modern consitutional state grounds the expectation of 
voluntary recognition by its citizens"122. The basic impartiality 
paradox is only relocated in the question of the critical public.
In a recent article on popular sovereignty123, Habermas takes 
up the question again, by setting out a model for modern 
society which takes democratic ambitions seriously. Rather 
than advocating an institutionalization of the "critical public" 
(Offentlichkeit), Habermas wants to keep it "fluid" and ever 
present. An institutionalized critical public would soon be 
absorbed by the political system. To avoid this, "communicative 
power is exercised in a way which is similar to that of a 
siege". This metaphor is meant to express that the political 
institutions of democracy must submit to a permanent process 
of criticism stemming from outside the political system124. 
However, we are warned against an "overburdening" of the 
citizens with moral expectations - an attitude of which the 
republican tradition (and most recently the "civic culture"
121 Ibid
122 Ibid, p.103-4.
123 "Volkssouveranitat als Verfahren. Ein normativer Begriff von 
Offentlichkeit" in 43, Merkur (1989) p.465-477.




























































































thesis) is guilty125. This presumption of virtue
(TugencLzumutung) cannot be the base on which to ground 
solid institutions of democracy. Habermas says, that we have 
to explain how it is possible in principle that the morals of 
citizens and their self-interest can go together126.
When Habermas insists on linking law to a moral 
argumentative discourse, he admits that this discourse is only 
able to promote correct results. It does not guarantee them. 
This is because the participants in such discourses act under 
local, social and temporal constraints and are thus liable to 
new arguments127. Although Habermas has attempted to 
accomodate these constraints through the introduction of 
discourses of application into his theory, this cannot avoid the 
following self-referential circle: it is only the participants of
the discourse who can judge if the just procedures have been 
respected and if the legal outcome therefore is correct. As 
Habermas puts it, "whether the demanding communicative 
presuppositions have been sufficiently met can only be judged 
from within the perspective of participants."128. How does 
Habermas solve this circle? The answer is, by supplementing 
the discourse procedures with jurdical procedures which 
guarantee "punctual, unambiguous and binding results"129.
125 Cf. ibid, p.475.
126 "Wir müssen erklâren, wie es im Prinzip moglich ist, dalB sich 
staatsbürgerliche Moral und Eigeninteresse miteinander verflechten." id., 
475.
127 "Towards a Communication Concept...", p.150.





























































































Habermas concludes: "So the socially-binding character — 
borrowed from the legal code — of a result that has been 
achieved conforming to the prescribed procedures substitutes 
the guarantee of pure procedural rationality."130. But this 
brings Habermas closer to the instrumental use of law ("law as 
a medium") than is perhaps comfortable. Recall Habermas’ 
assertion that positive law on its own is not able to stabilize 
itself by its own operations:
Seen from a purely functionalist perspective, law is entirely 
absorbed both by the contribution it makes to the power 
code and by fulfilling the code-function of its own. Viewed in 
this manner the circular process involving positive law and 
secular power should be able to rely on its own operations 
to stabilize itself. In fact this is not the case. Rather, the 
validity of positive law becomes paradoxical and a gap in 
legitimation opens up. How can law that has since become 
positive law meet with normative recognition and serve as 
the legitimizing basis for political power despite the fact 
that the political legislator can decide to change it at any 
time? Legal positivism again and again failed to explain 
this problematic condition, or rather denied its existence. 
The paradoxical situation can, however, be explained by the 
fact that the constitutive conditions of the complex of law 
and politics are violated as soon as the law, placed at the 
totally arbitrary disposition of some political legislator, 
ceases to serve as a resource for justice131.
It now seems as if Habermas were left with two self-referential 
circles, the argumentative (= communicative) and the juridical 
(= instrumental), both being in need of each other in order to 
stabilize themselves and each other. How might this work?132.
130 id.
131 Ibid, p. 148.
132 Consider Habermas’ assertion that "[t]he intertwining of both types of 
procedure triggers off a dialectical process in which positive law exceeds 





























































































It seems that the "internal connection between law and 
morality" is provided by the communicative element of law, 
transcending the borders of both. The communicative element 
is present when court decisions are submitted to the judgment 
of citizens:
The public character of the proceedings takes into account 
that the court’s presumed impartiality is in the final 
instance subject to the check of the open interpretative 
community of citizens. Ideally, the expert discourse must 
not lose this reference to the legal public, for the 
argumentational steps in adjudication are not fully 
determined by positive law and depend on complementary 
considerations of both a moral and a political nature133.
But does the complexity of contemporary societies really allow 
this? Do citizens understand and are they able to judge the 
expert discourse of law?
Habermas is quite realistic when he - this time speaking 
about politics - argues that under the conditions of complex 
societies these ideals have to be seen in more modest terms. 
He writes:
Given that in complex societies it is not possible to fulfill 
the demand for immediate participation, strict restrictions 
follow from the principle of popular sovreignty with regard 
to the selection, composition, business procedures and 
context of the representative bodies. A discourse by 
representatives satisfies conditions for equal participation at 
least indirectly to the extent that it remains open and 
sensitive to a public opinion arising from the grass roots, of 
a more or less informed, pluralist and spontaneous public 
sphere."134
133 "Towards a Communication-Concept...", p. 150.




























































































To invoke the paradoxical structure of the argument once 
more, one might say that on the one hand Habermas must 
presuppose a political culture and a legal public which is 
interested and capable of understanding and discussing the 
matters, while on the other he must not make strong claims in 
this respect. In order to avoid the demon of a self-referential 
legal system he must demand of the critical public 
considerable virtue thereby running the risk of "overburdening" 
it. It appears to us that the feasibility of his project depends to 
a great deal on the sucess of this balancing act.
4. Paradoxes and Social Loss
According to our basic intuition, any theory which aims at 
defining the right over the good without committing itself to 
some good, turns out to be self-contradictory or at least 
inconsistent. This inconsistency takes the form of a paradox. 
Habermas, working with a far more complex inter-disciplinary 
theory than that of Rawls, succeeds to defer the paradox by 
introducing new distinctions branching out into the fields of 
speech analysis, psychology, anthropology, social development 
theories and so on. But the paradox reappears, again and 
again. And like Rawls and Kymlicka, Habermas simply goes 
on, offering up the call to the faithful who will rally to the 
defence of the impartial "moral point of view".
The first instance of the paradox occurs when Habermas 




























































































resolves it by introducing the conceptual innovation of the (U) 
principle, claiming that this emerges only in modern ("post- 
traditional") societies. This leads him to a position which 
interprets the modern as the universal135, a new paradox. The 
resolution of this paradox comes through the introduction of 
solidarity as the obverse of justice. But here, the burden rests 
totally on assumptions of human nature, whereby Habermas 
claims a "tight connection" between the care for the well-being 
of the neighbour as well as for the common welfare. The 
notion of solidarity is expanded so that all humans may fall 
within it. In order to make this plausible, the "community of 
speakers" (Sprachgemeinschaft) is conceptulaized in purely 
cognitivist terms. But in so doing, the theory risks losing 
contact to the social realities of radical value conflicts in 
contemporary societies. If Habermas takes his assertion that 
questions of the good life are not amenable to theoretically 
binding discussions136 seriously, this would entail the existence 
of a plurality of goods unlikely to be harmonized.
Confronted with "neo-conservative" reproaches that his theory 
would amount to a "knowing better" or even an attempt to 
force upon unhappy subjects the knowledge of their real 
interests, Habermas answers that in his view the task of the
135 According to Habermas, the potential of rationality in the life-world 
amounts to the following:
(1) The universal is the rational 
(la ) The rational is universal
(2) The rational is modem
(3) The universal is modem




























































































philosopher is only to found the principle of universalization. 
Once this "rule of argumentation" is found, this does not 
prescribe any normative substance. Instead, all substantive 
questions must depend on (real or hypothetical) discourses. 
Here the philosopher just takes part in the discourse, but only 
as a concerned person, perhaps even as an expert, but never 
as the conductor of the discourse. It is significant that 
Habermas considers Rawls’ suggestions concerning a just 
society as belonging to the latter. That is to say, they are not 
universalizable but just the private opinion of John Rawls who 
wants to set them into practice. According to Habermas, Rawls 
just has to participate in debates as a citizen - just like 
everyone else137. To make sure that morality is in fact 
universal and not a reflection of particularistic views or 
interests, Habermas gives it a reformulation which relies on 
discourse ethics. This burdens him with the proof to 
demonstrate that discourse ethics really is universal.
Habermas himself admits that there is a justifiable 
scepticism with respect to discourse ethics on account of the 
hermeneutical criticism that the principles of discourse ethics 
cannot regulate the problems of their own application138. The 
hermeneutical criticism has it that the application of rules 
calls for a practical prudence which has to join discourse ethics 
additionally. Discourse ethics only works if it is supported by a 
capacity ("Vermogen") to link moral judgements to local
137 Habermas, "Moralitat...", p. 232.




























































































agreements139. Habermas’ response to this is that one has to 
change perspectives. The hermeneutical argument is only true 
if an observer examines the situation. As soon as this 
perspective is given up and the observer becomes a participant 
taking part in discussions in the first person, he or she cannot 
avoid the claims of a universalistic morals without ... 
"performative contradiction", a now famous argument which 
has been burdened not only with the tasks of defending the 
internal validity claims of speech acts, asking the critic-as- 
sceptic to yield to these claims or leave the discussion, but also 
with ... the task of refuting objections from (presumably 
psychologically under-developed) critics who cannot take the 
step to the "moral point of view" through their preference for 
the lowlands of the ethical.
This does not seem to leave much room for the recognition 
that a theory of justice based on a principle of
universalizability, however much tempered by discourses of 
application — since both Gunther and Habermas maintain that 
application discourses only deal with the application of norms, 
already validated in the discourse of justification — cancels 
certain life forms which are considered worthy by their 
holders. Despite the fact that the heavily sociologically- 
grounded theory of communicative action has a higher 
conceptual capacity than Rawlsian liberalism in identifying the 
radical conflict of values in contemporary Western societies, it 
remains less sensitive than Rawls’ theory to the fact that there 





























































































does not exclude some ways of life that realize in special ways 
fundamental values"140.
Prima facie, such a statement can be brushed off as a 
political truism - afterall "someone always loses...". But in the 
adoption of a stronger, developmental thesis of rationality, the 
use of a discourse of "pathologies", and the teleological 
commitment to the emancipatory potential of "modernity", 
Habermas misses what Rawls is beginning to recognize: that 
there is no sure answer to whether a life form "corresponding" 
to one rejected under a liberal theory of justice given one set 
of historical conditions, "would be viable under other historical 
conditions, and whether its passing is to be regretted"141, a 
question which goes to the heart of impartiality, and its 
"cutting edge" of civil disobedience. Unlike Habermas, Rawls 
has recognized that the optimistic view that "only unworthy 
forms of life lose out in a just constitutional regime" is 
"mistaken"142.
It would be too much to expect of Rawls that he revoke his 
theory of justice on this account. But it is heartening to see 
that in grappling with the problem of social loss, Rawls comes 
round to increasingly more transparent renditions of the 
paradox of the priority of the - impartial (?) - right. He states 
that:
I should have gone on explicitly to reject the idea ... that
only unworthy forms of life lose out in a just constitutional
140 Rawls, "PRIG", p.265.
141 "PRIG", p.266.




























































































regime. That optimistic view is mistaken. It may still be 
objected by those who affirm the conceptions [of the good] 
that cannot flourish that political liberalism does not allow 
sufficient space for them. But there is no criterion for what 
counts as sufficient space except that of a reasonable and 
defensible political conception of justice itself.143
What Habermas may yet have to offer, remains to be seen.
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